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SEA AND AIR SUBSIDIES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
JOSEPH L. SARISKY*
I. INTRODUCTION
TnHE national interest requires that the United States maintain thorough
and integrated ocean and air transportation systems. Recognizing
this, the Congress has authorized the payment of various subsidies to
water and air carriers. Expenditures by the Maritime Subsidy Board of
the Maritime Administration, Department of Commerce, for assistance to
ocean shipping will amount to $297 million in 1967,1 and similar expen-
ditures in the form of direct subsidy payments by the Civil Aeronautics
Board to certain air carriers are estimated at $73 million for 1967.2
Assistance to these carriers, although generous, is continually provided in
what is generally an inimical climate. Corporate decisions in all phases
of operations, rather than reflecting sound market judgment, are cau-
tiously based upon the need to maintain political and public support of
Government financial assistance. This decision-making is concurrently
attended by an increasingly detailed concern by the Government with
such purely corporate matters as executive salaries, investments, diversi-
fication, and internal organization and reorganization.
From the viewpoint of pure economics, efficient allocation of resources
is not accomplished by an administrative agency through its determination
of the amount of subsidy payment due, but by the application of the his-
torical concept of efficient allocation by way of the price system. The
world, however, does not always reflect this idealized condition of
economic theory. Changing conditions require new responses, since the
modem market is not readily receptive to pure historical economic theory.
Market imperfections do exist, and with such imperfections acknowledged,
a continuing attempt at a sustained rationalization of the pricing system
of the economy to these modes of transportation might well lead to an
over-all deterioration, rather than improvement, of resource allocation.
As stated by Mr. Pegrum:
Under existing conditions, there is evidently overinvestment in transportation. The
railroads as a whole are unable to secure adequate revenues for their operations, while
motor, air, and water transport do not cover the full economic cost attributable to
their activities. If public policy were to require each of the modes to cover its full
* Attorney, Office of the General Counsel of the Maritime Administration, US.
Department of Commerce. Any opinions expressed in this article are those of the author, and
do not represent an official position taken by the faritime Administration.
1. The Budget of the United States, Fiscal Year 1967, 105 [hereinafter cited as Budget].
2. Id.
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costs, there would undoubtedly be a considerable reduction in air and water transport,
and probably in motor trucking.3
A factor contributing to the inability of the air and water carriers to
recover their full economic costs is the unfeasibility of establishing an
inventory of outputs which must be many-sided yet able to insure a
capacity sufficient to meet peak demand or load factors which cannot
be charged to these peak demand users, as required by sound economic
theory. A surcharge on weekend and holiday flights would undoubtedly
result in many complaints and possible revenue losses. Tariff increases
during the Korean conflict, Suez crisis, or the present Viet-Nam situation
would lead to the same results.
Since these services, in their entirety, cannot be provided at a price
that is justified in that it attracts sufficient volume over extended periods
of time so as to pay their own way, two alternatives are available:
subsidized service or no service at all. In ocean shipping and air carrier
service, the public policy requires subsidized service in lieu of their
elimination.' To insure that this service is provided at "maximum
efficiency and frugality," President Johnson submitted his Transportation
Message to the Congress, wherein he sought the creation of a Department
of Transportation.' A primary function of the new Department was to
respond to rising transportation requirements with "new institutions
and new programs."6 The purpose of this study is to determine whether
present subsidy payment procedures reflect "efficiency and frugality" in
the light of the interacting causes giving rise to subsidy, the legislative
requirements, and the principles and procedures adopted by the respective
administrative agencies responsible for making subsidy determinations.
3. D.F. Pegrum, Transportation: Economics and Public Policy 463 (1963). However, the
ripple effect of this reduction on small or isolated communities would unfortunately result
in their economic and physical impairment, which the Congress has indicated is not in the
national interest.
4. Subsidized transportation is now becoming an accepted way of life. See J.R. Meyer,
J.F. Kain & M. Wohl, The Urban Transportation Problem (1965). The question was
asked by Adam Smith in 1776: what is more valuable, water or diamonds? The reply was:
water, since the world would be more harmed without water than without diamonds. Sea
and air transportation, like water, must be valued by their social and economic usefulness
and the effect of their absence on the national and international economy.
5. Message from the President of the United States, H.R. Doc. No. 399, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1966). The message recommended that the Civil Aeronautics Board and its subsidy
functions remain outside the new Department but that the Board consider criteria and
principles developed by the Secretary so that "the subsidy program will be coordinated with
overall transportation policy." Id. at 6. The inclusion of the Maritime Administration in
the Department was recommended by the President. However, when the compromise bill
was passed, the Congress had excluded the Maritime Administration Act of Oct. 15, 1966,
Pub. L. No. 89-670, 80 Stat. 931 (1966).
6. Message from the President of the United States, supra note 5, at 14.
[Vol. 36
SEA AND AIR SUBSIDIES
Examination of present proposals and their compatability with existing
conditions will also be considered. Inasmuch as this study is limited to
direct payments to air carriers, it will not consider contributions made by
the Federal Aviation Agency through the Federal aid to airports program
by way of matching funds for airport facilities,7 providing navigational
aids,' air traffic control service,9 safety inspection, 10 and certification of
airmen" and aircraft.12 Indirect aids to ocean shipping, including cargo
preference,' 3 deferred tax on deposits to capital 4 and special reserve
funds,' 5 credit aid,'8 and war risk insurance, 7 are also beyond the scope
of this study.
7. Federal Airport Act, 60 Stat. 170 (1946), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1101 (1964).
Congress has appropriated $71 million for fiscal year 1967 in the airport program. Budget
at 317. Regulations promulgated by the Federal Aviation Agency are found in 14 C.F.R.
§ 151 (1966).
8. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stit. 749 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1348 (1964).
9. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 750 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1349 (1964).
10. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 778 (1958), 49 US.C. § 1425 (1964).
11. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 776 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1422 (1964).
12. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 776 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1423 (1964). Subsidies
to air carriers generally take on three forms: (1) free use of airways controlled and financed
by the FAA; (2) nominal payment for use of airport facilities which are financed by federal,
state and municipal funds; (3) direct subsidy through mail payments. A portion of this
amount is allocated to services rendered, but the bulk is for direct subsidy. Services and
programs provided by the FAA are substantial, requiring a budget of over $750 million
for 1967. Budget at 317. The CAB and FAA are considering a service charge to airlines in
an attempt to recoup a portion of these expenditures. The CAB has estimated an annual
yield of $300,000 to $40 ,000 under existing statutory provisions. The FAA seeks to recover
less than half its $30 million expenditure for operating the safety, inspection and certification
function of the Flight Standard Service. Aviation Week and Space Technology, March 13,
1967, at 32.
13. See Hearings on Ocean Transportation of Grain to Russia, Before the Subcomm.
on the Study of the Merchant Marine of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964); Hearings on Administration of the Cargo Preference
Act Before the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 84th Cong., 1st Ses.
(1955); Implementation of the Cargo Preference Laws, S. Rep. No. 2286, 87th Cong,
2d Sess. (1962) ; Dep't of Commerce, A Review of Direct and Indirect Types of Maritime
Subsidies with Special Reference to Cargo Preference Aid (1956); Olson, Cargo Preference
and the American Merchant Marine, 25 Law & Contemp. Prob. 82 (1960).
14. Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 49 Stat. 2005 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 1177 (1964).
15. Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 49 Stat. 2000 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 1161 (1964).
16. Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 49 Stat. 2017 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 1271 (1964). Out-
standing balance of principal and interest of insured mortgages and loans, and further
commitments by the Maritime Administration to insure, amount to $485,184,00 on 83
ships. Maritime Administration Ann. Rep., H.R. Doc. No. 21, 90th Cong, 2d Sess. 28
(1966). Cf. Maritime Administration, Federal Ship Mortgage Insurance, Financing of Ship
Construction, Reconstruction or Reconditioning (1966).
17. Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 49 Stat. 2017 (1936), 46 U.5.C. § 1281 (1964).
Approximately 4,000 binders on 1,500 vessels were outstanding as of June 30, 1966, with
1967]
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II. INCEPTION OF SEA AND AIR SUBSIDIES
In 1840, technological progress gave shipowners the opportunity to
change their fleets' propulsion systems from sail to steam power. Faced
with the immense costs involved in this modification, the shipowners for
the first time looked to the federal government for aid. Fortunately, this
technological innovation proved timely, because the volume of mail
between the United States and Europe increased substantially, and the
capacity of the sailboat to deliver this mail efficiently and within a
reasonable time was uncertain. Following the precedent established by
England and other maritime nations, the federal government began its
aid to ocean shipping with the overseas mail service."8
On March 3, 1845, Congress authorized the Postmaster General to
invite bids on contracts to carry mail between the United States and
abroad." Regular subsidized service between New York and Bremen,
Havre, Liverpool and Panama was established under the Act of 1845.
Subsidy payments averaged between $19,250 and $35,000 per round trip,
and aggregated government expenditures to 1858 amounted to $14,-
400,000.20
A second round of ocean-mail contracts was authorized by Congress on
May 28, 1864.21 Pursuant to the provisions of this Act, the United States
and Brazil entered into a ten year contract for monthly voyages between
the United States and South America. Of the $250,000 annual subsidy
requirement, the United States contributed $150,000 and Brazil $100,000.
Subsequent subsidies to various individual American flag lines amounted
to approximately $6,500,000 between 1864 and 1877.22
The Ocean Mail Act of 189121 provided for mail-subsidy payments to
various classes of steamships and inaugurated a trade-route system which
has remained basically unchanged up to the present day. Under the Act's
directive to "subserve and promote the postal and commercial interest of
the United States,12 4 the Postmaster General invited bids under which
contracts were subsequently awarded on routes which varied in number
a maximum insurance exposure of $13 billion. Maritime Administration Ann. Rep., H.R.
Doc. No. 21, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1966).
18. For a history of maritime nations subsidizing their commercial fleets, see Saugstad,
Shipping and Shipbuilding Subsidies, United States Dep't of Commerce Trade Promotion
Series, No. 129 (1932). Official reports on the mail subsidy issues existing in 1845 are found
in S. Rep. No. 267, 32d Cong., 1st Sess. (1845); H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 91, 32d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1845).
19. 5 Stat. 748 (1845).
20. C.E.McDowell, Ocean Transportation 249 (1954).
21. 13 Stat. 93 (1864).
22. C.E.McDoweil, supra note 20.
23. 26 Stat. 830(1891).
24. Id.
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from four to nine. The Act remained in effect until 1923, and total subsidy
in the form of mail payments totaled $29,630,000.25
The Merchant Marine Act of 192021 substantially retained the pro-
visions of the Ocean Mail Act of 1891. Legislative modification relating
to ocean mail carriage was limited to a proviso requiring the United States
Shipping Board and the Postmaster General jointly to determine ocean
mail payments to shipowners. Subsidy paid between 1923 and 1929 under
the provisions of this Act totalled $4,800,000.21
The Merchant Marine Act of 1928 - represented a slightly different
approach to ocean mail subsidy. Section 41420 amendments provided for
certification by the Postmaster General to the United States Shipping
Board as to the ocean mail routes the Postmaster General initially deter-
mined should be established, including dates of sailing and volume of mail
carried. Authority previously vested in the Postmaster General to adver-
tise for bids and enter into ocean mail contracts with American citizens
was retained. Under the Merchant Marine Act of 1928, Post Office appro-
priations were used to pay approximately $200 million in mail subsidies,
of which $25 million represented actual incurred cost for mail in fact
carriedV0
The inception of Government assistance to the air industry paralleled
in methodology that previously given to ocean shipping. Some seventy
years after technology provided man with a faster and more efficient ship
through steam propulsion, it presented man with an entirely new method
of transportation-the airplane 1 The attitude prevailing when assistance
was given to ocean shipping was still in existence when efforts to establish
private airlines were unsuccessful because capital requirements and risk
were beyond the capacity of private enterprise. This attitude reflected
the public's reluctance to accept any form of direct Government aid to
private segments of the economy. The Government, which had already
recognized the economic and military potential of the airplane and de-
cided upon a program to promote and encourage the air industry, found
itself between Scylla and Charybdis. However, the precedent established
by the ocean mail contracts provided the solution, and folklore evolved
into immemorial usage, establishing a working partnership between Gov-
25. C.EMcDowell, supra note 20, at 250.
26. 41 Stat. 988 (1920), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 861 (1964).
27. C.E.McDowell, supra note 20, at 255.
28. 45 Stat. 689 (1928), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 891 (1964).
29. 45 Stat. 696 (1928), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 866 (1964).
30. U.S. Maritime Comm'n, Economic Survey of the American Merchant Marine 78
(1937).
31. Technological innovations continue, providing improved methods of transportation
as well as complex legal problems; see Sarisky, The Law and an Unprecedented Mode of
Transportation: The Hovercraft, 16 J. Pub. L. 1 (1967).
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ernment assistance and Post Office appropriations. This method proved
expedient, since the aid was not direct and identifiable but indirect and
obscured. It also provided a colorable appearance of the Government pay-
ing for services rendered, notwithstanding the fact that the amounts paid
did not reflect the true value of the actual services rendered.
Initial congressional action relating to air mail contracts came with the
passage of the Air Mail Act of 1925,32 usually called the Kelley Act. The
Act established rates for air mail, and authorized the Postmaster General
to contract with the air industry to transport mail at a rate not exceeding
four-fifths of the revenues derived from such air mail service. 8 Contracts
let by the Postmaster General under the Kelley Act were for feeder routes,
and the Government continued to operate all transcontinental routes until
1927. 4
The Kelley Act was amended in 1926 to provide for rates not exceed-
ing $3.00 a pound for the first 1,000 miles and increases not exceeding 30
cents a pound for each additional 100 miles.30 This provision permitted
air carriers the same amount of pay for voyages of 300 and 1,000 miles. 7
The defect was corrected by a 1928 amendment 8 to the Kelley Act which
provided for periodic negotiations between the carrier and the Postmaster
General. This amendment sought to encourage use of the air mail system
and eliminated the restriction of payments to four-fifths of revenues.
Between 1925 and 1928, prior to the second amendment of the Kelley
Act, subsidy (air mail expenditures less revenues) averaged about $400,-
32. 39 U.S.C. §§ 4301-03, 6301 (1964). Hearings on the bill are contained in Air Mail
-Government Owned and Operated and Contract Service, Hearings on H.R. 6942 and
H.R. 7064 Before a Subcomm. of House Comm. on the Post Office and Post Roads,
68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924).
33. Id. The Act formed the foundation for the modern air carrier system. The carriers
initially awarded mail contracts under the Act became United, American, and Trans World
Airlines. H.L.Smith, Ainvays: The History of Commercial Aviation in the United States
104 (1942).
34. The Post Office Department had its own air services for the carrying of mail
beginning in 1918. See F.C.Thayer, Air Transport Policy and National Security 6 (1965).
35. 39 U.S.C. §§ 4301-03, 6301 (1964).
36. F. Spencer, Air Mail Payment and the Government 33 (1941). Post Office Appropria-
tions for the carriage of foreign mail by aircraft and ship were jointly included in Post
Office Appropriations for 1925. Of the $8,500,000 appropriated, a sum "not to exceed
$150,000 . . .may be expended for carrying of foreign mail by aircraft." 43 Stat. 786 (1925).
The 1927 Appropriation was increased to $8,700,000 and prohibited expenditures "on any
contracts heretofore made under the authority of section 24 of the Merchant Marine Act,
1920." 44 Stat. 1050 (1927).
37. F. Spencer, supra at 35.
38. 45 Stat. 594 (1928).
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000 for domestic and foreign carriage. Under the provisions of the second
amendment, subsidy payments rose to almost $7 million in 1929V'
The Watres Act of 193040 vested extensive powers of supervision and
control over air carriers in the Postmaster General by giving him the
power to prescribe rates of compensation. On May 1, 1930, the Postmaster
General promulgated his first formula under the Watres Act."' This
formula eliminated cost experience considerations and provided an in-
centive for cost reduction in that it did not provide for any adjustment
for greater passenger loads. Payments under this formula by the Post
Office Department to the air mail carriers totaled approximately $84
million for the period between January 1930 and February 1934.2
As hereinafter discussed, the Civil Aeronautics Act of 193811 created
the Civil Aeronautics Authority and brought the determination of all air
mail rates and the regulations of foreign air carriers under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Authority."
39. Federal Coordinator of Transportation, Public Aids to Transportation vol. 1, pt. 2,
at 125 (1940).
40. 46 Stat. 259 (1930).
41. The detailed formula was as follows:
Mail load variable: Cents per Mile
200 pounds, 12.5 cubic feet of space ............................ 55.0
400 pounds, 25.0 cubic feet of space ............................ 65.0
750 pounds, 47.0 cubic feet of space ............................ 75.0
1,000 pounds, 62.5 cubic feet of space ............................ 8S.0
1,250 pounds, 78.0 cubic feet of space ............................ 90.0
1,600 pounds, 80.0-100.0 cubic feet of space ...................... 92-5
2,000 pounds, 125 cubic feet of space .............................. 95.0
Other variables (additional compensation):
Might flying .................................................... 15.0
Bad terrain .................................................... 2.0
Fog ........................................................... 2-5
One-way radio equipment ...................................... 3.0
Two-way radio equipment ...................................... 6.0
Capacity for 2 to 5 passengers .................................. 1-5
Capacity for 6 to 9 passengers .................................. 3.0
Capacity for 10 to 19 passengers .................................. 45
Capacity for 20 to 29 passengers .................................. 6.0
Capacity for 30 or more passengers .............................. 7-5
Multimotored equipment ....................................... 13.0
Quoted by F. Spencer, supra note 36, at 45-46.
42. Id. at 48-51.
43. 52 Stat. 973 (1938).
44. Air mail legislation passed after the Watres Act included the Air Mail Act of 1934
(Black-McKellar Act), 48 Stat. 933 (1934), which revised previous air mail legislation to
include a study group (The Federal Aviation Commission) and granted authority to the
Interstate Commerce Commission to determine air mail rates, to the Post Office Department
to designate mail schedules and routes in terms of air mail needs, and to the Department
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
III. STATUTORY PROVISIONS
In 1935 President Franklin D. Roosevelt sent his message on the
American Merchant Marine to the Congress, wherein he stated, in part,
that:
In many instances in our history the Congress has provided for various kinds of
disguised subsidies to American shipping. . . . The Government today is paying
annually about $30,000,000 for the carrying of mails which would cost, under normal
ocean rates, only $3,000,000. The difference, $27,000,000, is a subsidy and nothing but
a subsidy. .... I propose that we end this subterfuge. If the Congress decides that
it will maintain a reasonably adequate American merchant marine I believe that it
can well afford honestly to call a subsidy by its right name. Approached in this way
a subsidy amounts to a comparatively simple thing. It must be based upon providing
for American shipping Government aid to make up the differential between American
and foreign shipping costs.
4 5
The following year Congress passed the Merchant Marine Act of
1936.11 Although the Act itself was based on the mail route system, its
acceptance of direct Government aid to any private sector of the economy
was indeed sweeping and revolutionary. Previously, the Congress had
repeatedly refused outright aid, giving assistance indirectly and through
inchmeal mail carriage legislation. The traditional channeling of govern-
ment aid through Post Office appropriations was now ended,47 and in its
place the United States Maritime Commission was created. 8 The Act was
of Commerce to certify aircraft as to airworthiness and other safety features. A mail-pay
formula was established whereby the amount of payment was conditioned upon the type
and capacity of aircraft utilized rather than upon the volume of mail carried. The 1934
amendment to the Black-McKellar Act, 48 Stat. 1243 (1934), permitted a holder of a mall
contract on one primary route to hold two routes other than that primary route. The 1935
amendment of the Black-McKellar Act, 49 Stat. 30 (1935), extended the effective date of the
contract holding restrictions. The Meade-McKellar Amendment of 1935, 49 Stat. 614 (1935),
extended the services provided by previous air mail legislation. For a comprehensive study
of early air mail legislation see P. David, The Economics of Air Mail Transportation (1934);
Special Committee of the Senate to Investigate Air Mail Contracts, Investigation of Air
Mail and Ocean Mail Contracts, S. Rep. No. 898, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
45. 79 Cong. Rec. 2859-60 (1935).
46. 49 Stat. 1985 (1936), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 1101 (1964).
47. 49 Stat. 1988 (1936), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 1119 (1964). All appropriations for
transportation of foreign mail (other than by air) and all powers and duties of the Post-
master General respecting ocean mail were transferred to the Commission.
48. The U.S. Maritime Commission was abolished by Reorganization Plan No. 21 of
1950, and the Commission's functions transferred to the Federal Maritime Board In the
Department of Commerce and to the Secretary of Commerce. 3 CF.R. 1012 (1949-1953
Comp.) Reorganization Plan No. 7 of 1961 transferred the Federal Maritime Board's subsidy
award functions to the Secretary of Commerce and abolished the Board. 3 C.F.R. 875
(1959-1963 Comp.). By Department of Commerce Order No. 117-A and 117-B, the Secretary
of Commerce delegated all maritime subsidy functions to the Maritime Subsidy Board
composed of the Maritime Administrator, the Deputy Maritime Administrator, and the
General Counsel of the Maritime Administration. 31 Fed. Reg. 8087, 8246 (1966).
[Vol. 36
1967] SEA AND AIR SUBSIDIES
comprehensive in its coverage, empowering the Commission to grant a
construction-differential subsidy on vessels built, reconstructed, or recon-
ditioned in the United States and suitable for use in the national de-
fense; 49 to grant an operating-differential subsidy on vessels utilized on
essential trade routes;1° to grant loans for the construction of vessels,
either with or without a construction-differential subsidy;'I to allow credit
for obsolete vessels taken in exchange for new vessels; 2 to make full pay-
ment for national defense features incorporated into the vessel; O to
guarantee ship mortgages; 54 to establish construction reserve funds with
income tax benefits accruing to subsidized operators; 5 to train American
citizens as licensed and unlicensed personnel on American flag vessels; to
establish the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy;50 and to grant additional
countervailing subsidies to offset the effect of government aid by other
maritime nations to their ocean fleets.-
Direct Government assistance to ocean shipping is granted through con-
struction differential payments and operating differential subsidies. As to
construction subsidies, section 502(b) of the Merchant Marine Act of
1936, provides that a
"Construction differential subsidy" may equal, but not exceed, the excess of the bid of
the shipbuilder constructing the proposed vessel... over the fair and reasonable esti-
mate of cost, as determined by the [Board], of the construction of the proposed vessel
if it were constructed under like plans and specifications . . . in a principal foreign
shipbuilding center . . . which is deemed by the [Board] to furnish a fair and
representative example for the determination of the estimated cost of construction
in foreign countries of vessels of the type proposed to be constructed: Provided, that
the construction differential approved by the [Board] shall not exceed 33A per centum
of the construction cost of the vessel... except in cases where the [Board] possesses
conclusive evidence that the actual differential is greater than that percentage, in which
case the [Board] may approve an allowance not to exceed 50 per centum of such
cost. .... 8
49. 49 Stat. 1995 (1936), as amended, 46 U-S.C. § 1151 (1964).
50. 49 Stat. 2001 (1936), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 1171 (1964).
51. 49 Stat. 2000 (1936), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 1159 (1964). Since 1954 financial
assistance has been confined to mortgage guarantees under this section.
52. 53 Stat. 1183 (1939) (added to Merchant Marine Act of 1936), as amended, 46
U.S.C. § 1160 (1964), as amended, (Supp. I, 1965). Trade-in value is determined as cost
less depredation.
53. 49 Stat. 1998 (1936), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 1154 (1964).
54. 52 Stat. 969 (1938) (added to Merchant Marine Act of 1936), as amended, 46 US.C.
§ 1271 (1964).
55. 52 Stat. 969 (1938) (added to Merchant Marine Act of 1936), as amended, 46
U.S.C. § 1161 (1964).
56. 52 Stat. 965 (1938) (added to Merchant Marine Act of 1936), as amended, 46
U.S.C. § 1126 (1964).
57. 49 Stat. 2003 (1936), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 1174 (1964).
58. 49 Stat. 1996 (1936), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 1152 (1964), as amended, (Supp. I,
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This provision enabled the Commission to build ships for its own account
and then sell them to subsidized operators at a price equal to not less than
67%% of the construction cost of the vessel. Since 1954 subsidized ship
construction has been undertaken pursuant to section 504 of the Act,"9
which provides that the Government, the subsidized operator, and the
shipyard may enter into a tri-partite construction contract for the account
of the operator. The subsidized operator is obligated to pay only the
estimated foreign construction cost of the vessel, which may not exceed
55% of the domestic cost of construction. Over the past several years, the
estimated foreign construction cost has averaged approximately 46% of
the domestic construction cost. Progress payments, based upon a com-
plicated 1,000 point construction schedule, are made jointly by the oper-
ator and the Government to the shipyard. The subsidized operator pays
46% of the amount of each such progress payment, and the Government
54%. Therefore, on a typical dry cargo vessel built in an American ship-
yard to American standards and meeting the requirements of the Coast
Guard, Public Health Service, Department of Agriculture, and American
Bureau of Shipping, at a price of $12 million, the subsidized operator will
pay about $5,520,000. A construction differential subsidy will cover the
remaining $6,480,000 of the construction price. The purpose of the con-
struction differential subsidy is to offset the difference between the price
of a ship constructed to American standards and requirements in a United
States shipyard and that of one built in a foreign yard."0
The award of a construction differential subsidy contract is purely
within the discretion of the Maritime Subsidy Board. This discretion was
recently emphasized by the Board in that "the Board's determination to
aid the Owner in constructing a ship with the payment of construction
subsidy is under a statute which gives to the Board a discretionary author-
ity to grant this subsidy. The Owner has no statutory right to subsidy in
any certain amount."'"
Government assistance to subsidized American flag operators in the
form of operating differential subsidy is granted by the provisions of Title
1965). The Board has been consistently provided with such evidence so that construction
subsidy generally has not been less than 50%.
59. 49 Stat. 1998 (1936), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 1154 (1964). Amendments to the
Act have raised the construction subsidy limitation from 33Y% to 55% for specified periods
of time. Pub. L. 89-589 (Sept. 19, 1966) is the most recent and extends the applicable date
to June 30, 1968. 80 Stat. 811 (1966).
60. For a critical view of construction subsidy calculations, see Note, The Disclosure-
Hearing Dilemma in Maritime Subsidy Disputes, 19 Stan. L. Rev. 431 (1967); Let's Give
Subsidies the Deep Six, Fortune, Oct., 1961, p. 104.
61. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., Determination of Construction Differential
Subsidy, 7 Pike & Fischer, Shipping Regulation Reports 91, 95 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
SRR].
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VI of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936.2 Section 603 (b)l provides, in
part, that:
Such contract shall provide that the amount of the operating-differential subsidy ...
shall not exceed the excess of the fair and reasonable cost of insurance, maintenance,
repairs not compensated by insurance, wages and subsistence of officers and crews,
and any other items of expense in which the [Board] shall find and determine that
the applicant is at a substantial disadvantage in competition with such vessels of the
foreign country hereinafter referred to, in the operation under United States registry
of the vessel or vessels covered by the contract, over the estimated fair and reasonable
cost of the same items of expense . . if such vessel or vessels were operated under
the registry of a foreign country whose vessels are substantial competitors of the
vessel or vessels covered by the contract.
Determinations by the Maritime Subsidy Board in making operating
differential payments are extremely complex, requiring the acquisition of
cost data on all major flag merchant fleets. 4 Separate findings for each
statutory item of expense-insurance, 5 wages, 6 repairs,"- maintenance," s
and ship's stores 0S-must be made in each operating subsidy calculation.
The Maritime Subsidy Board's primary consideration in making these
determinations is the compensation of the American flag operator for the
additional costs he incurs by hiring an American crew and purchasing his
insurance, ship stores and repair work from American sources.
The Civil Aeronautics Act
In 1938, the financial conditions of the air industry were uncertain, and
predictions of commercial chaos and bodily harm due to inadequate safety
were conveyed by the industry to the Congress." Among the causes
enumerated by industry spokesmen was the fact that the legislative pro-
visions of the law were so worded that interpretation and administration
by three different federal agencies were in many instances inconsistent
and conflicting.71 Congress responded; the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938'2
vested all responsibility for air transportation in one agency and made it
clear that the public interest in air transportation went beyond the carry-
ing of the mail:
62. 49 Stat. 2001 (1936), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 1171 (1964).
63. 49 Stat. 2002 (1936), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 1173 (1964).
64. For a study of the legal problems associated with this acquisition, sec May, The
Status of the Federal Maritime Commission Shipping Regulations Under Principles of
International Law, 54 Geo. L.. 794 (1966); Comment, Regulating Ocean Shipping:
Powers and Problems of the Federal Maritime Commission, 51 Calif. L. Rev. 986 (1963).
65. 46 C.F.R. § 289 (1966).
66. 46 C.F.R. § 262 (1966).
67. 46 C.F.R. § 237 (1966).
68. 46 C.F.R. § 272 (1966).
69. 46 C.F.R. § 293 (1966).
70. C. Kelly, The Sky's The Limit 101 (1963).
71. F. Spencer, supra note .36, at 225.
72. 52 Stat. 973 (1938).
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In the exercise and performance of its powers and duties under this Act, the Authority
shall consider the following, among other things, as being in the public interest, and
in accordance with the public convenience and necessity-
(a) The encouragement and development of an air-transportation system properly
adapted to the present and future needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of
the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense;
(b) The regulation of air transportation in such manner as to recognize and
preserve the inherent advantages of, assure the highest degree of safety in, and
foster sound economic conditions in, such transportation, and to improve the relations
between, and coordinate transporation by, air carriers;
(c) The promotion of adequate, economical, and efficient service by air carriers
at reasonable charges, without unjust discriminations, undue preferences or advantages,
or unfair or destructive competitive practices;
(d) Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound development of an
air-transportation system properly adapted to the needs of the foreign and domestic
commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense;
(e) The regulation of air commerce in such manner as to best promote its
development and safety; and
(f) The encouragement and development of civil aeronautics. 78
Sections 406(a) and 406(b) authorize the CAB to determine and pay
subsidies to airlines. Section 406(b)(3) reads as follows:
[T]he need of each such air carrier for compensation for the transportation of mail
sufficient to insure the performance of such service, and, together with all other
revenues of the air carrier, to enable such air carrier under honest, economical, and
efficient management, to maintain and continue the development of air transportation
to the extent and of the character and quality required for the commerce of the
United States, the Postal Service, and the national defense.74
It is this need clause, and the CAB implementation thereof, by which
the Board has established various rates which fill the carriers' bursary
so as to eliminate the gap between commercial revenues, plus service mail
pay and operating costs, and an income which includes allowances for
profit and income tax.75
IV. RESTRICTED ENTRY
A. Air Carriers
The provisions of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 and the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958 provided the air carrier industry with "protection
so efficacious that not one carrier has been certificated to perform domestic
73. The Federal Aviation Act of 1958, successor to the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938,
adopts these objectives verbatim, except that objective (e) was changed to read "The
promotion of safety in air commerce," and objective (f) to read "The promotion, encourage-
ment, and development of civil aeronautics." 52 Stat. 980, as amended, 72 Stat. 740,
49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1964).
74. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 763, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1376(b) (3)
(1964). The text of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 and related statutes are found in
Civil Aeronautics Board, Aeronautical Statutes and Related Materials (1963).
75. Stanley, Is Air Mail Subsidy Justified?, 76 Pub. Util. Fort. 33 (1965).
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trunk service which was not operating on May 14, 1938 and thus qualified
for a certificate under the automatic-certification (grandfather) clause.M70
This result is not due to any congressional or judicial mandate but to the
CAB interpretation of public convenience and necessity as requiring the
expansion of existing routes of the underprivileged carriers, as well as
the Board's own doctrine of "presumption" of parallel services by differ-
ent air carriers. Expansion of the route structure of an inauspicious carrier
to include a more profitable route structure strengthens the financial
condition of such a carrier, thereby reducing subsidy payments. Admission
of a new carrier on a profitable route structure competing with a certifi-
cated carrier would destroy the opportunity to reduce subsidy payments
by increasing profits. The only exception to the Board's interpretation of
public convenience and necessity came in 1950 when public convenience
and necessity was shown by a whole class of carriers, the non-schedules,
which were simultaneously certified en masse by the Board rather than
be exempted from the provisions of the Act.77
Entry into the certificated air carrier industry can be accomplished by
embarking on Ixion's Wheel and initially providing a specialized service
that subsequently evolves into a competitive situation with the trunklines,
such as is now being done by the local air carriers. 8 By this method of
service and route expansion, such competition in various markets does
now exist. Another method of entry is to gain admission to a special seg-
ment of the industry. This was successfully done by Trans-Caribbean
Airways in the New York to San Juan market.Y'
B. Ocean Carriers
Entry into the subsidized American merchant fleet is similarly re-
stricted. As of June 30, 1966, the Maritime Subsidy Board (hereinafter
referred to as MSB) had outstanding operating-differential subsidy con-
76. Comment, Is Regulation Necessary? California Air Transportation and National
Regulatory Policy, 74 Yale L.J. 1416, 1420 (1965) (footnote omitted).
77. R. Caves, Air Transport and its Regulators 169-191, (1962). See L. Keyes, Federal
Control of Entry into Air Transportation (1951); Keyes, A Reconsideration of Federal
Control of Entry into Air Transportation, 22 J. Air L. & Com. 192 (1955); fIaclay & Burt,
Entry of New Carriers into Domestic Trunkline Air Transportation, 22 J. Air L. & Com.
131 (1955).
78. Arguments are currently being made to remove operating restrictions on the local
carriers so as to permit full competition with the trunklines, turning over the thin unprofit-
able routes to a subsidized "third-level" air carrier. See Elliott, Development of Third Level
Air Transportation, 29 J. Air L. & Com. 182 (1963); Barnes, Airline Subsidies-Purpose,
Cause and Control, Pt. I, 26 J. Air L. & Com. 311 (1959); Pt. II, 27 J. Air L. & Com. 29
(1960); Wright, Locals Ask Densest Short-Haul Markets, 44 Aviation Week & Space
Technology, Feb. 7, 1966, at 35.
79. Trans-Caribbean Airways, Charters, 30 C.A.B. 1560 (1960).
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tracts with fourteen steamship lines, an increase of two since 1939.80 The
Board has six applications from ocean carriers seeking entry into the
subsidy program."' Of these six, half have been pending since 1957.82
The primary obstacles to entry into the subsidized merchant fleet are
lack of appropriations and various restrictive statutory provisions. Section
601 (a) (2) of the Merchant Marine Act requires that "the applicant
owns, or can and will build or purchase, a vessel or vessels of the size, type,
speed, and number, and with the proper equipment required to enable
him to operate and maintain the service, route, or line, in such manner as
may be necessary to meet competitive conditions, and to promote foreign
commerce .... 1;83
The Act further requires that an applicant for operating differential
subsidy have sufficient capital or net worth to make a down payment of
25% on the purchase price of a new vessel built in the United States when
the 25 year statutory life of the vessels he currently operates has ex-
pired. 4
Additional statutory provisions restricting entry into, or the expansion
of existing United States subsidized ocean service include section 605 (c)
of the Act which provides that:
[N]o contract shall be made under this title with respect to a vessel to be operated
on a service, route, or line served by citizens of the United States which would be in
addition to the existing service, or services, unless the [Board] shall determine after
proper hearing of all parties that the service already provided by vessels of United
States registry in such service, route, or line is inadequate, and that in the accomplish-
ment of the purposes and policy of this Act additional vessels should be operated
thereon. .... 85
Section 101 provides that: "It is necessary for the national defense and
development of its foreign and domestic commerce that the United States
shall have a merchant marine (a) sufficient to carry its domestic water-
borne commerce and a substantial portion of the water-borne export and
import foreign commerce of the United States . . .,,2
The Secretary of Commerce has interpreted "substantial portion" to
80. Annual Report of the Maritime Administration 16 (1966).
81. These applications include Atlantic Express Lines of America, Inc., Central Gulf
Steamship Corp., Isthmian Lines, Inc., Sea Coach Transatlantic Lines, Inc., States Marine
Lines, Inc., and Waterman Steamship Corp. Id. at 17.
82. In his proposal to bring the Maritime Administration into the Department of Trans-
portation, the Secretary of Transportation, Alan S. Boyd, proposed that entry into the
subsidized program be granted to Waterman, States Marine, and Central Gulf. N.Y. Times,
March 22, 1967, at 92, col. 8.
83. Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 49 Stat. 2001, as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 1171(a) (2)
(1964).
84. 49 Stat. 1996, as amended, 52 Stat. 956, 46 U.S.C. § 1152(c) (1964).
85. 49 Stat. 2003, 46 U.S.C. § 1175 (1964).
86. 49 Stat. 1985, 46 U.S.C. § 1101 (1964).
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mean that United States flag ships should carry 507o of America's water-
borne foreign commerce. 7 The ultimate issue to be resolved under these
provisions is whether the proposed service would redistribute business
from a present subsidized carrier to a new subsidized carrier or whether
the United States carriers would obtain a greater proportion of the water-
borne commerce. Where the result is a redistribution, entry or expansion
is restricted.
V. ADMINISTRATIVE SUBsIDY DETERMINATIONS
Subsidy determinations by the CAB and the MSB differ primarily in
procedure rather than substance. The CAB determines type, quality, and
quantum of services to be provided, and the rate of subsidy is fixed in
advance. 8 The MSB, on the other hand, does not determine the final
subsidy rate' for several years after the expiration of the subsidy-rate
year in question."0 Further, the CAB determines subsidy on a class basis
rather than by individual carrier,9 while MSB subsidy determinations
are considered on the basis of the individual carrier, permitting evaluation
of the special requirements of the carrier in its trade route and its speci-
fically identified predominant competitor 2 There is no inconsistency be-
tween the concepts, since, under section 406(b) of the Act, a CAB class
rate can be reopened by an individual carrier to provide it with the oppor-
tunity to earn subsidy according to its individual "need."
The Federal Aviation Act provides the CAB with more flexibility in
87. Atlantic Express Lines of America Inc., Subsidy Application, Combination Pa-enger/
Cargo Service, 2 SRR 725, 732 (1963).
88. Local-Service Class Subsidy Rate Investigation, 34 C.A.B. 416 (1961). Where the
"final future" subsidy rate is inadequate, the rate can be reopened under section 406(a) of
the Act.
89. The method of maritime subsidy requires a recognition of a distinction between actual
costs and subsidized costs. Actual costs represent payment made to various factors of
production. Where they differ, the MSB utilizes the homeport average of all American flag
operators. Primary differences are in wages and bunkering fuel cost which differ between
American ports. Subsidized costs are actual costs less subsidy. They represent privately
incurred costs by the average subsidized American flag operator after subsidy payment. See
A. Ferguson, E. Lerner, J. McGee, W. Oi & S. Sobotka, The Economic Value of the
American Merchant Marine 108-09 (1961).
90. Section 603(c) of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 1173(c)
(1964), originally provided for interim payments not exceeding 751 of the previous subsidy
rate. The amount was subsequently increased to 90%o. Act of Sept. 14, 1961, Pub. L. No.
87-243, 75 Stat. 513 (1961).
91. 34 CA.B. at 428 (1961).
92. When the estimated cost of a predominant competitor cannot be obtained, the costs
of other principal foreign competitors, in order of importance, are used. Therefore, where
the predominant competitor does not operate a specific type of vessel, the MSB %ill consider
foreign cost estimates of a similar vessel employed by a substantial competitor. See, eg,
American President Lines, Ltd., Subsidy Rate Determination for Combination Vessel, 7 SRR
847 (1966).
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determining subsidy. The Act provides that the Board may "fix different
rates for different air carriers or classes of air carriers, and different
classes of service."9 Subsidy is then paid on the basis of the "need of
each such air carrier."'' " The Merchant Marine Act, however, provides
that subsidy "shall not exceed the excess of the fair and reasonable cost
of insurance, maintenance, repairs ... , wages and subsistence . . . " in-
curred by a substantial foreign competitor.9" The MSB therefore is not
only confined to a "parity" formula but is also limited in application to
each individual vessel of each subsidized line.
On March 3, 1967, the newly appointed Secretary of Transportation,
Alan S. Boyd, proposed that the Maritime Administration and its subsidy
functions be transferred to the Department of Transportation. Mr.
Boyd further proposed that maritime subsidy payments be based on
"need" rather than "parity.""97 The tentative name of "variable subsidy
system" was given to the proposal."8 A review of the administrative de-
terminations under the "need" and "parity" principles will indicate their
general compatibilities and incompatibilities under a "variable subsidy
system."
A. Need v. Parity
Prior to 1961, the CAB determined the payment to the carrier on the
basis of "need," i.e., the difference between revenue and expenses plus a
return on investment.99 The carrier would initially total its revenues, make
proper adjustments, determine the amount needed to break-even and
provide a reasonable return on investment, then apply to the CAB for
subsidy. In 1961, the CAB devised a class rate formula whereby need was
computed on the basis of the total of the carriers break-even need, return
allowances, and taxes. 0 ° The predetermined subsidy rate was established
by the Board as the rate per available seat-miles at density factors ranging
from 300 to 600 revenue plane miles per station per day during the month
93. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 763, 49 U.S.C. § 1376(b)(1964), as amended,
80 Stat. 942 (1966).
94. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1376(b)(3) (1964).
95. Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 49 Stat. 2002, 46 U.S.C. § 1173(b) (1964).
96. J. of Commerce & Commercial L., March 3, 1967, at 1, col. 2.
97. Id. at 24, col. 1.
98. Id.
99. Since the early 1950's the trunk carriers have not received any direct subsidy payments
from the CAB. Only the local-service carriers and other smaller segments of the air industry
continue to receive this kind of subsidy. R. Caves, supra note 77, at 253. The need
calculation does not merely provide a cost-of-service-plus-profit compensation but includes
an increment whereby the carrier may continue development. North Central Airlines, Inc.
v. CAB, 363 F.2d 983, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
100. 34 C.A.B. 416 (1961).
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in question.1"' The reasonable rate of return was set as the weighted
average rate of return arrived at by applying rates of 21.35% to common
stock equity, 7.5% to preferred stock equity, and 5.5% to the debt
components of recognized investment. The rate of return after taxes could
not be less than 9% or more than 12.759.102 Under this class rate for-
mula, operating cost had no direct relation to the amount of subsidy paid
since such payment was now based on the class rate multiplied by avail-
able seat miles. The formula therefore provided an incentive to reduce
operating costs, because the reduction was reflected as profits.
The class rate also provided that the CAB would share 509  of any
profits earned between the established rate of return and a return of 15%
on investment, and 75% of the profit in excess of 15%o.1°
At a press conference on December 29, 1966, Chairman Murphy an-
nounced that the CAB was in the process of revising the 1961 class rate
formula so as to relate subsidy payments to market pairs and route
structure."' This revision was subsequently released by the Board on
March 31, 1967,105 and provided for a subsidy limitation of two round
trips per day between market points on subsidy-eligible routes. The pre-
vious class rate formula was abandoned and provision made to relate
subsidy payments to services between each pair of cities on a local car-
rier's route. This method would specifically identify the uneconomical
traffic levels and recognize routes that cannot be operated at a profit. 00
Allowable rate of return on equity capital was reduced from 16% to
101. The class rate formula provided by the Board, 34 C.A.B. at 469, features a sliding
scale whereby a given density factor is related to the daily volume of plane miles at a
station. This then has an analogous rate which, when multiplied by the total available seat
miles, gives the amount of the subsidy. Thus, a subsidy rate of 3.11 cents per available seat
miles would be paid a carrier operating 300 revenue plane miles per station per day. The
rate would decline to 1.90 cents on the basis of 600 miles per station and flight increases
beyond this point would not be eligible for subsidy. Therefore, as traffic volume increases,
the subsidy for available seat mile decreases. Cook, Local Carriers W New Subsidy
Formula, 74 Aviation Week and Space Technology, March 13, 1961, at 155-59; Cook, Trans-
continental Routes Awarded to Strengthen Delta and National, 74 Aviation Week and
Space Technology, March 20, 1961, at 36-37.
102. 34 CA.B. at 445.
103. The formula provided:
Rate of return after taxes (per cent) Percentage of profit refunded by carrier
O to D1 ........................................ 0
D to 15 ........................................ 50
Over 15 ........................................ 75
(DI Represents the fair and reasonable differentiated rate of return.)
104. Background Material for Chairman Murphy's Press Conference of Thursday, Decem-
ber 29, 1966, C.A.B. Release (unnumbered).
105. C.A.B. Release 67-47, 382-6031.
106. Aviation Week & Space Technology, April 10, 1967, at 36.
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14%,1 °7 and CAB profit sharing was modified to provide for a "revenue
growth adjustment" wherein 8.6 cents of each "growth dollar" would
result in a subsidy reduction.
The apparent objective of the Board in promulgating the revised stan-
dard' is to follow its previously announced policy of replacing direct
government subsidy by internal subsidy, with revenue from profitable
routes helping to defray expenses of serving unprofitable markets.'
The parity concept, as enunciated by the Merchant Marine Act of 1936,
is a labyrinthian concept in its administration. The data required to
support parity determinations come not only from all the major maritime
nations of the world, but also from a multitude of federal agencies such
as the Coast Guard, Collector of Customs, Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service, Department of Commerce and the Department of Labor. In
a dynamic world economy, foreign cost data are almost obsolete upon
receipt, yet they form the cornerstone upon which the MSB estimates the
fair and reasonable expenses of a predominant foreign competitor as
compared to the actual expenses of an American flag operator. The com-
petency of the entire subsidy determination process is contingent upon
the accuracy of reported costs and the cost to which the subsidy rate is
applied. The American flag operator's cost records are audited by the
Board, with items of cost evaluated as to their reasonableness.
After these data are collected, analyzed and evaluated, a comparative
manning estimate is developed on ships operating on all subsidized routes,
including American flag and competitive foreign flag vessels. Foreign
exchange rates are obtained from the Treasury Department, while wage
and price indices are obtained from other federal agencies. A composite
weighted differential is assigned, based upon the proportion of the trade
carried by the respective foreign and American flag vessels on each trade
route. Negative differentials are applied to offset any positive differentials.
Notwithstanding the absence of precise arithmetical computation "be-
cause of the many variables which cloak the cyclical nature of the indus-
try,""n0 a subsidy rate:
107. This rate of return was the result of previously modified class rate formulae. Class
rate II was promulgated by the Board on March 1 and 22, 1963 in Orders Nos. E-19340
and E-19405. Class rate III was introduced by the Board on August 28 and September 22,
1964, in Orders Nos. E-21227 and E-21311. Class rate III-A was promulgated on May 18,
1966, by Order No. E-23697. An offset computation normally relieves an air carrier of the
numerous risks inherent in a future period rate. Trans World Airlines, Inc., Order No.
E-22022 (April 12, 1965).
108. See Appendix attached hereto.
109. 80 Aviation Week & Space Technology, March 6, 1967, at 223.
110. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., Consolidated Dockets S-153, S-155, S-158, and S-178, Sept. 1,
1966, at 26.
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is administratively determined by the Board.... The rate so determined is proffered
to the operator and . the operator is given an opportunity either to accept or to
reject the proffered rate. . . . Should the operator have any questions regarding the
rate proffered, it is extended an opportunity to discuss with the staff. . . . If a
corrected determination is shown to be necessary through these discussions, but
without consideration of new data, a new determination is made and a new rate is
proffered to the operator.
If a mutually acceptable determination is not arrived at in accordance with these
procedures, and if the operator rejects the proffered administrative determination,
it is entitled to and may request a hearing under Section 606(l) .... M
Section 603 (b) of the Act 2 then requires the subtraction of the estimated
foreign cost from the actual cost experience of the American flag operator
to determine "the excess" which is compensated for by subsidy payments.
In 1955, the MSB's predecessor promulgated the Manual of General
Procedures for Determining Operating Differential Subsidy Rates."' The
Manual provides the standard by which the Board calculates operating
differential subsidy. The twofold purpose of the Manual was announced
by the Board: (1) to establish the factual basis on which the Board shall
calculate operating differential subsidy rates; and (2) to delineate the
areas of cooperative effort between the Board and the subsidized operators
as to the collection of data on domestic and foreign operating costs and
practices." 4 The Manual is composed of seven parts: (1) wages of officers
and crews;"' (2) subsistence of officers and crews;' (3) maintenance
and repairs;". (4) hull and machinery insurance;"" (5) protection and
indemnity insurance; 19 (6) reports required to be submitted by oper-
ators; 0 and (7) definitions of subsidizable items of expense? -2
111. American President Lines, Ltd, Subsidy Rate Determination for Combination
Vessel, Docket S-170, August 29, 1966, 9-10.
112. Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 49 Stat. 2002, as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 1173(b)
(1964).
113. The Manual is reprinted in 186 Current Service SRR 103 (1961).
114. Manual, supra note 113, at iii.
115. Id. at 1.
116. Id. at 7.
117. Id. at 15.
118. Id. at 23.
119. Id. at 27.
120. Id. at 35.
121. Id. at 49. A sample calculation in determining wage differential, assuming that
substantial competition offered by the Netherlands is 35%, Norway 20%, and the United
Kingdom 45%, is provided on p. 5 of the Manual as follows:
United Nether- United
States lands Norway Kingdom
Number in Crew ...................... 50 55 44 52
Percentage of Overtime to Base Wages .... 37.22% 20,39% 22.31% 15.35%
Base Wages ............................ $16,900 $ 4,340 $ 4,052 $ 4,240
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B. Agreements Affecting Subsidy
Under section 412 of the Federal Aviation Act, 22 the CAB determines
whether a collective bargaining agreement is adverse to the public
interest or in violation of the Act. The elements of public interest are
found in section 102 of the Act. 23 Section 401 (k) 24 requires, as a con-
dition to holding a certificate of public convenience and necessity, ad-
herence to Title II of the Railway Labor Act. 25
Since the risk of a strike loss represents an abnormal risk which is
neither predictable nor measurable, the CAB had determined that strike
losses must be borne by the carrier's rate of return on investment, rather
than its break-even need.120 However, since a carrier is required to show
only "need" in addition to honest, economical and efficient management
in determining its eligibility for subsidy payments, the CAB was repri-
manded by the court, in American Overseas Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, for
denying subsidy payments for strike losses. The court stated: "The ob-
jective of the Congress is plain. It is the maintenance and continued de-
velopment of air transportation to the extent and of the quality required
for the national commerce, postal service, and defense. The objective is
on a grand scale. It is for the public interest. It is vital. The words used
are important, because they depict with clarity a congressional policy.
-127
Overtime .............................. 6,290
Vacation (leave) ........................ 850
Area and Miscellaneous Bonuses
and other Allowances ..................
Repatriation ............................ -
Social Security .......................... 590
Welfare, Pension and Unemployment
Fund Payments ...................... 650
Total Monthly Wage Costs .............. $25,280
Differential-Excess of U.S. Cost
over Foreign ....................................
Unweighted Differential ............................
Competition Weight Factor ........................
Weighted Differential ..............................
Composite Weighted Differential ....................
Foreign Exchange Rates ............................
904 651
504 429
1,179
350
247
501 170 70
$ 8,107 $ 7,406 $ 5,703
17,173
67.93%
35.0 %
23.78%
17,874
70.70%
20.0 %
14.14%
19,577
77.44%
45.0 %
34.85%
72.77%
Fl. Kr. i
$0.263158 $0.1400 $2.80
122. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 770 (1958), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1382
(1964).
123. 72 Stat. 740 (1958), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1964).
124. 72 Stat. 756-57 (1958), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1371(k) (1964).
125. Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151, 181 (1964).
126. Braniff Airways, Inc., Mail Rates, 9 C.A.B. 607 (1948); National Airlines, Inc., Mail
Rates, 22 C.A.B. 524 (1955).
127. American Overseas Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 254 F.2d 744, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
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The Board subsequently found that the American Overseas decision pre-
cluded the Board from disallowing strike costs per se but that under the
test of honest, economical and efficient management, the Board will in-
quire into management performance during a strike, and where the losses
are not attributable to failure of honest, economical and efficient manage-
ment, the Board will allow their assignment to break-even need rather
than return on investment. 8 The Board subsequently developed a ra-
tionale, justifying this inclusion on the ground that the added subsidy did
not represent payment for services not being performed but for the per-
formance and development of services after the strike."a
Section 412 of the Federal Aviation Act also requires Board approval
of mutual aid agreements between air carriers. Pursuant to this require-
ment, the CAB disapproved a mutual aid agreement between American
Airlines and Mohawk Airlines on the ground that in the event American
sustained a loss due to a labor strike, payments made to it by Mohawk
would increase Mohawk's subsidy need. 3 ' An agreement which involves
the contingency of indirect use of subsidy funds for strike protection of
an air carrier is not in the public interest."'
Under section 603 (b) of the Merchant Marine Act, a subsidy cannot
exceed the difference between the American operator's expenses (including
wages) and the estimated cost of the same items to the competitive
foreign-flag operator. 32 Wages represent approximately 85%o of all
maritime operating differential subsidy payments. Since the average
American seaman earns four times the salary of his foreign counterpart,
the operator pays only 28%o of the wage dollar, with the federal govern-
ment subsidizing the remainder. Therefore, every wage increase agreed
to by the operator is borne completely by the Government.13
Until 1965 the MSB had accepted, for subsidy payment purposes, the
results of collective bargaining agreements between subsidized operators
and various maritime unions. On July 13, 1965, the Board disapproved
three collective bargaining agreements between the American Merchant
Marine Institute and the Marine Engineers Beneficial Association,14 the
National Maritime Union'35 and the International Association of Masters,
128. Southern Airways, Mail Rates, 31 C.A.B. 1079 (1960).
129. Trans World Airlines, Inc., Order No. E-22022 (1965), 18-19 (opinion of the
Board).
130. C.A.B. Order No. E-24213 (1966).
131. Id. It is against the public policy to underwrite mutual aid expenses with subsidy for
strike losses since "they are made without reference to the statutory standard of 'economical
and effident management."' Pan American Mail-Rate Case, 35 C.A.B. 540, 555 (1962).
132. 49 Stat. 2002 (1936), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 1173(b) (1964).
133. Opinion and Order of the Secretary of Commerce on MSB Dockets A-14, A-IS, and
A-16, 6 SRR 37 (1965).
134. MSB Docket No. A-14, 6 SRR 1 (1965).
135. MSB Docket No. A-15, 6 SRR 17 (1965).
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Mates, and Pilots. 36 The basis for the Board's disapproval was that all
the agreements exceeded the 3.2 presidential guideline. The Board further
indicated that no longer are collective bargaining agreements to be
deemed, ipso facto, to represent the fair and reasonable wage standards
required by section 603 (b) of the Act for subsidy payments.
The Secretary of Commerce reversed the Board on the grounds that
the agreements were signed two years prior to the Board's decision with-
out notice of the "new stricter standard."' 37 The Secretary further noted
that the President's 3.2 guideline should not be the sole criterion against
which to measure reasonableness of wage settlements.188 The Secretary
established various procedures in reviewing the agreements but did not
establish standards by which the reasonableness of a privately negotiated
collective bargaining agreement can be administratively determined.
The MSB, like the CAB, will inquire into management performance
during a strike to determine whether losses sustained could have been
avoided by economical and efficient management. Under section 606(6)
of the Merchant Marine Act 39 and Article II-1 of the Operating Differ-
ential Subsidy Contract, 4 ' the subsidized operator is required to conduct
its operations in an economical and efficient manner. In determining the
elements of "economic and efficient" management, the MSB looks to the
conduct of other shipowners under similar circumstances, the forsee-
ability of the circumstances involved, and the comparative cost of avail-
able alternatives. In Grace Line Inc., '4 the operator claimed additional
subsidy for three ships idled in foreign ports for a cumulative total of
111 days. The Board first noted that of the 180 subsidized vessels on the
Atlantic and Gulf coasts affected by the 1965 seagoing officers strike, only
one other ship was held in a foreign port and then only for 16 days. 4 '
The Board then concluded that without the additional subsidy of $344,085
being claimed by Grace, its net earnings on the vessels of $137,287 became
a loss of $206,798 because of the idleness in a foreign port-"hardly an
efficient and economical operation."' 4
136. MSB Docket No. A-16, 6 SRR 25 (1965).
137. Opinion and Order, supra note 133, at 42.
138. Id.
139. 49 Stat. 2064 (1936), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 1176(6) (1964).
140. The wording of section 606(6) and Article II-1 are synonymous and provide that
the Operator shall conduct its business and its operations with respect to the vessels'
services, routes, and lines covered by an agreement in the most economical and efficient
manner, but with due regard to the wage and manning scale and working conditions pre-
scribed by the United States.
141. MSB Docket No. A-28 (1966).
142. Holding a vessel in a foreign port substantially increases costs since the crew must
be maintained on full pay status in a foreign port. Upon arrival in a United States port the
crew can be paid off on arrival.
143. MSB Docket No. A-28 (1966), at 6.
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C. Subsidy Reduction Programs
The CAB has continually set a standard that has resulted in the re-
duction of subsidy and the furthering of its ultimate and plausible goal
of gradually eliminating direct Government subsidy payments. The latest
summary of subsidy accruing to air carriers establishes a decreasing
reliance upon subsidy. The total subsidy figure declined from $83,092,000
in fiscal 1964 to $68,065,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1967, a
decrease of $15,027,000 or 18 per cent.1" Factors contributing to this
subsidy reduction are Board approval of short haul profitable market
transfers from the trunklines to the local air service carriers, and the
inauguration of the "use it or lose it" policy.14 5
The transfer of short-haul profitable routes does not extend new
services to new points nor does it improve existing services. It merely
involves the substitution of a local carrier over routes which, although
operated profitably by a trunkline, are by nature better adapted to the
services of a local carrier."' Thus Mohawk was substituted for Eastern,
but without subsidy, on a route which was being profitably operated by
Eastern,.. and North Central was permitted to operate a route between
Madison, Wisconsin and Chicago which was in competition with North-
west but which eliminated intermediate stops requiring subsidy. 8 When
a carrier is awarded non-stop authority between two market points,
thereby providing an opportunity for substantial profit, the Board's
policy is to delete the new award from the class-rate subsidy computation
and further adjust subsidy payment to eliminate the discrepency between
need and subsidy payable.4 9
The basic issue in route awards to local service carriers is "whether
the estimated subsidy cost is commensurate with the benefits that will
144. Air Transport Association of America, Air Transport, Facts and Figures 8 (1967).
145. The policy relates to the services offered by the subsidized local air carriers and is
codified at 14 C.F.R. § 399.11 (1966). Para. (b) states that "under this 'use it or lose it'
policy, the Board will require each city to originate an average of five or more passengers
per day during the 12-month period following the initial 6 months of operations. If a city
is certificated on more than one segment, the five-passenger standard will be applied to each
segment. If a city fails to meet this minimum traffic standard, the Board will, in the
absence of unusual or compelling circumstances, institute a formal investigation to determine
whether service should be suspended or terminated."
146. Eastern-Mohawk Transfer Case, 34 C.A.B. 274, 277 (1961). The Board distinguished
the Supreme Court decision in Delta Air Lines v. Summerfied, 347 US. 74 (19S4), as holding
that the need of an air carrier is the limit of subsidy and not "that the Court would require
the Board to grant subsidy to the extent of overall need where it has found in authorizing
certain of the carrier's operations that they should not entail any right to subsidy." Id. at
278.
147. Id.
148. North Central Airlines Inc., Order No. E-23463 (C.A.B. 1966).
149. Local-Service Class Subsidy Rate Investigation, 36 C.A.B. 797 (1962).
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flow from the authorization."'150 Accordingly, the Board found that an
award of the Des Moines-St. Louis segment to Ozark at an estimated an-
nual subsidy cost of $131,279 was warranted by the substantial benefits
accruing to the traveling public, the carrier and the Government.'' The
basis for the Board's approval appears to be that the new route structure
offered Ozark more flexibility in operations, thereby reducing operating
costs and in turn reducing subsidy payments.52
The Board has refused to authorize awards where the record showed
that a route could not be operated without substantial subsidy, even
though the carrier was willing to provide service on a non-subsidized basis
to demonstrate the reasonableness of its financial forecast. 3  Once an
award of a route is made on a non-subsidy basis, it cannot be subsequently
converted to a subsidy route without a full evidentiary hearing to ascer-
tain the extent of the Government's obligation. 4
The CAB recognizes that development of air transportation does not
require that all points in the United States be served, nor that all points
served by an airline be profitable. The frequency of service and the vol-
ume of traffic that a carrier is operating are elements considered by the
Board. The Board is mindful of the fact that the volume of traffic will
result in some unprofitable points, as well as some profitable points, on
any airline. In order to minimize the unprofitable points and still meet
the long-range objectives of the Act, the Board adopted the "use it or
lose it" approach in the Seven States Area Investigation.' Under this
policy, smaller communities are afforded the opportunity to demonstrate
whether they can use and support air carrier service. The test is deter-
mined to a great extent on the amount of traffic developed by such com-
munities. Subsidy cost is but one consideration in determining whether
or not the service should be continued under the "use it or lose it"
policy.'56 Since the Board is committed to reducing local-service carrier
subsidy whenever possible, the elimination of uneconomical cities and
route segments from a route is an available method of accomplishing this
reduction. 5 7
150. Ozark Air Lines, Inc., Order No. E-23096 (C.A.B. 1966).
151. Id.
152. Board Member Gilhland dissented, noting that Ozark's commercial revenues In
relation to its costs required subsidy in fiscal year 1965, at an average of $4.91 for every
passenger it flew. Mr. Gillilland concluded that the result of this award was to "replace one
deficiency by a larger one." Id.
153. Hi-Plains Airways, 38 C.A.B. 1 (1963).
154. Cordova Airlines, 34 C.A.B. 796, 797 (1961).
155. 28 C.A.B. 680, 755 (1958).
156. Southern Airways, Order No. E-23087 (C.A.B. 1965) (initial decision of Examiner
Joseph L. Fitzmaurice).
157. Wyoming-South Dakota-Chicago Air Service Investigation, 36 C.A.B. 703, 752
(1962).
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Even though a city has met the minimum 5-a-day enplanement standard
of the policy, the circumstances must be viewed in terms of the long-range
objectives of local service carriers, one of which is continued control over
subsidy and the gradual progress toward self-sufficiency. 158 Thus the
Board found that when the good citizens of Winona, Minnesota partici-
pated in a drive during the month of December to increase enplaning by
donating airline tickets to college students for use during their Christmas
vacation, the citizens merely generated "artificial" boardingsr which
do not show genuine growth in traffic or need for service. However, the
enterprise and industry which developed such a program convinced the
Board that the community would support air service and endeavor to
develop traffic potential."ee
The scope of subsidy determinations by the MSB differs somewhat from
CAB subsidy considerations, and the reduction procedures therefore
differ. Initially, the MSB's primary subsidy responsibility is to the
international movement of cargo rather than the domestic and interna-
tional movement of passengers. In addition, the MSB does not have the
operational flexibility of the CAB; the MSB cannot refuse to relieve a
trunkline from a loss operation solely because the transfer to a local
service carrier would result in the increase of subsidy payments."' Fur-
ther, legislative provisions have given the initiative to the operator, once
an operating differential subsidy contract is signed, to institute proceed-
ings that result in a reduction of subsidy payments. Section 606(4) of the
Merchant Marine Act provides "that if at any time the contractor receiv-
ing an operating-differential subsidy claims that he cannot maintain and
operate his vessels on such service, route, or line, with a reasonable profit
upon his investment, and applies to the [Board] for a modification or
rescission of his contract to maintain such service, route, or line .... 2 2
This provision authorizes the Board to readjust the amount of subsidy
payments when it determines that a change in the service is necessary for
the accomplishment of the purposes of the Act." However, the matter
must be originated by the operator, not the Board.
Further restrictions on maritime subsidy reduction programs include a
statutory requirement that ocean services be maintained "regularly" and
"permanently" unless their operations result in "heavy" financial losses.
Paragraphs (a) and (b) of section 211 of the Merchant Marine Act
158. Ozark A.. 31 C.A.B. 974-75 (1960).
159. North Central Airlines, 32 C.A.B. 1205, 1206 (1961); see Trans-Texas Airways, 30
C.A.B. 484 (1959).
160. North Central Airlines, 32 C.A.B. 1205 (1961) (by implication).
161. Pacific Northwest Local-Service Case, 29 C.A.B. 660 (1959); Service to Terre
Haute, Indiana, Order No. E-22029 (1965).
162. 49 Stat. 2004 (1936), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 1176 (1964).
163. 49 Stat. 2004 (1936), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 1176 (1964).
1967]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
clearly require American flag service on routes and lines which are not
profitable:
The ocean services, routes, and lines from ports in the United States, or in a
Territory, district, or possession thereof, to foreign markets . . . essential for the
promotion, development, expansion, and maintenance of the foreign commerce of the
United States . . . the [Board] shall consider and give due weight to the cost of
maintaining each of such steamship lines, the probability that any such line cannot
be maintained except at a heavy loss disproportionate to the benefit accruing to
foreign trade ....
b) the vessels . . . should be employed in such services . . . with a view to
furnishing adequate, regular, certain, and permanent service .... 104
The plain meaning of these provisions is that a service or route may be
determined essential even though the operation will result in substantial
losses. The Board allowed an operator to abandon service, thereby reduc-
ing subsidy payments, after the Board determined that a "heavy loss
disproportionate to the benefit accruing to foreign trade" occurred when
Grace Line showed a current annual loss of $1,657,000 on a trade route
and an estimated future loss of $120,000 per voyage and an additional pro
rata of ballast and lay-up cost of approximately $250,000 on the SSs Santa
Alicia, Santa Cristina, Santa Regina, and Santa Mercedes. 10 The Board
found that "in the absence of any objection having been received from any
of the American shippers or exporters who will be affected by the dis-
continuance . . . we do not feel impelled to require the continuation of
the losses even though Grace does not have a right under section 606(4)
to a contract modification to so provide."'i
6
The MSB has approved a transfer of the interest in a trade route where
the result of such a transfer was a possible subsidy recapture because of
greater anticipated revenues.0 7 Approval of the transfer from one sub-
sidized operator to another occurred on the basis that "prospects for
greater revenue with possible subsidy recapture appeared to offer interest-
ing possibilities for attainment with the net effect of achieving a more
functional alignment of existing subsidized service."'0 8
Operational flexibility reduces operating costs and accordingly reduces
subsidy payments. The MSB, therefore, will approve a domestic leg on a
foreign voyage if operational flexibility is thus attained. When an ocean
carrier is operated in domestic and subsidized foreign trade on the same
voyage, section 605 (a) of the Act 69 requires subsidy proration according
164. 49 Stat. 1989 (1936), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 1121 (1964).
165. Grace Line Inc., Contract Modification, 6 F.M.B. 82 (1960).
166. Id. at 87.
167. United States Lines Co., and Farrell Lines, Inc., Transfer of Subsidized Service,
Docket No. A-12, 5 SRR 1030 (1965).
168. Id. at 1033.
169. 49 Stat. 2003 (1936), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 1175 (1964).
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to the degree of domestic operation. Such a proration does not eliminate
all subsidy from the domestic portion of the voyage, and therefore a
residue of subsidy may remain. Prior to MSB authorization of domestic
participation by a subsidized carrier, section 805 (a) of the Act" 0 requires
a finding that no "unfair competition" to domestic carriers would result. 7 '
When such a finding is made and a domestic leg permitted, the effect is
competition with unsubsidized domestic carriers and not with foreign
flag vessels.
In a decision involving an application by States Steamship Company to
call at Hawaii to and from the Far East, the MSB found that coastal and
intercoastal carriers are not fundamentally entitled to protection from
subsidized operators. 2 Further, the resulting advantage of the subsidized
operator was not such "an overwhelming unconscionable advantage as to
constitute unfair competition."'7 3 Since the ratio of domestic to foreign
trade was not disproportionate and the competition not unfair, the
estimated annual operating subsidy recapture of $800,000, required by
section 605 (a), 74 and the annual construction subsidy refund of $57,800
per vessel annually, as required by section 506 of the Act,1 justified
States Steamship to call at Hawaii. The Board was upheld by the Secre-
tary of Commerce on the ground that such factors as government aid in
various forms, statutory restrictions and the projected trade growth were
equalizing forces favoring domestic operators. 70 The Secretary was
subsequently upheld by the Federal District Court for the Northern
District of California. 77
170. 49 Stat. 2012 (1936), as amended, 46 US.C. § 1223 (1964).
171. The Board had previously denied permission to Pacific Far East Lines to operate
unsubsidized service between the Pacific Coast and Hawaii on the grounds that such service
would be prejudicial to the objectives of the Merchant Marine Act. The court reversed the
Board holding that "unfair competition" required a showing of cutthroat competition or
competition that is unfair according to accepted legal or ethical standards. Pacific Far East
Lines v. Federal Maritime Board, 275 F.2d 184, 186 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
172. States Steamship Company, Application to Call at Hawaii, 3 SRR 215, 227 (1963).
173. Id. at 226.
174. This section provides in part that "if the subsidized vessel earns any gross
revenue on the carriage of mail, passengers, or cargo by reason of such coastal ... trade the
subsidy payment for the entire voyage shall be reduced by an amount which bears the
same ratio to the subsidy otherwise payable as such gross revenue. . . . " 49 Stat. 2003
(1936), as amended, 46 US.C. § 1175 (1964).
175. 49 Stat. 1999 (1936), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 1156 (1964). This section provides
that "if the vessel is operated in the domestic trade ... he will pay annually to the [Board]
that proportion of one twenty-fifth of the construction-differential subsidy paid for such
vessel as the gross revenue derived from the domestic trade bears to the gross revenue derived
from the entire voyages . ...
176. 5 SRR 1111 (1965).
177. Matson Navigation Co. v. Connor, 258 F. Supp. 144 (NJD. Cal. 1966).
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VI. AnR SUBSIDY DECLINE
Total subsidies for the local air carriers have gradually declined since
1963. Subsidies, as a per cent of total local carrier revenues, have been
declining over the last 13 years, 78 along with subsidy per revenue passen-
ger.
The CAB estimates that with the current rate of traffic growth and air-
craft utilization, the local air carriers will have an operating profit of
$1 million in 1970-a negative break-even need.179 With a required return
and tax element of $70 million, total subsidy for the local carriers will
remain near current levels.
80
VII. MARITIME SUBSIDY INCREASES
A recent study published by the Brookings Institution demonstrated
the forces that contribute to substantial increases in direct subsidy pay-
ments and which are beyond the control of the subsidized American flag
operator. 8 ' These forces include the devaluations in foreign currencies,
tariffs, price supports, price administration, cargo preference, and in-
creases in the U.S. wage rates. 82 These increases are shown by the follow-
ing table: 8 3
OPERATING SUBsIDY COST INDICES
Item 1938a  1949 1956 1964
Net subsidy accrual, after recapture (millions) $ 3.6 $ 29.7 $106.2 $208.6
Number of ships under subsidy contracts 119 254 305 317
Average subsidy paid per ship (thousands) $ 30 $117 $348 $658
Average subsidy in constant dollars (thousands)b $ 70 $140 $362 $655
Subsidy as per cent of freight and passenger
revenues C C 18% 27%
Per cent of wage costs met through subsidy 40% 61% 72% 71%
Per cent of gross subsidy recaptured 70% 33% 17% 1%
Source: Maritime Administration data.
a Estimated.
b Subsidy payments adjusted for changes in wholesale price index, 1957-59 base.
c Not available.
178. The hearings before the Aviation Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. Ser. No. 89-62, at 31 (1966), revealed a decline in subsidies per
revenue passenger from $11.94 in 1952 to $5.88 in 1965.
179. Id. at 32.
180. Id. at 33.
181. S. Lawrence, United States Merchant Shipping Policies and Politics 206 (1966).
182. Id.
183. Id.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of the subsidy is not just to help the carriers to furnish
needed ocean and air services which are not self-supporting."" The sub-
sidy provides the framework by which payment is made to local air
carriers to establish air service to small communities and to ocean
carriers to carry the water-borne commerce of the United States. The
justification for the expenditures of appropriated funds is not to aid
particular air or ocean carriers but to make possible the public services
that they provide.185
The CAB has been provided with more elasticity than the MSB, both
by statute and inherent operational characteristics, to have these services
provided at less cost to the Government. Initially, the United States air
industry is distinguished as an enterprise which excels uniquely because
of its resources and technology. In 1966, there were 645 various Boeing
aircraft in service, compared to 54 built by the British Aircraft Corpora-
tion. 88 Aircraft orders for delivery between 1967 and 1970 show Boeing
with 427 orders, compared with two for British Aircraft Corporation.8
The United States merchant marine, on the other hand, does not enjoy
this delivery preeminence. In 1964, Japanese shipyards launched 715
vessels of 100 tons gross and over, Germany 193, Great Britain 179,
Holland 140, Norway 121, and the United States only 80.11 This disparity
in shipbuilding is the result not of technological deficiencies but of over-
lapping regulation and inspection requirements and design complexities.
Estimated savings of 20 to 30 per cent per vessel could be realized upon
simplification of design and regulatory and inspection requirements. 89
The CAB has statutory authorization to encourage local carriers to
expand their route structure in order to reduce subsidies. With new short-
haul jet equipment,' 9° the locals can compete effectively with the trunk-
lines in the dense short-haul markets, and profits derived therefrom will
substantially reduce direct government subsidy. This procedure, however,
184. These non-self-supporting air services are provided only by the local air carriers
and other smaller segments of the air industry. R. Caves, Air Transport and Its Regulators
253 (1962).
185. Hearings, supra note 178, at 34.
186. Air Transport Association of America, supra note 144, at 42.
187. Id. at 43.
188. Shipping World and Shipbuilder, International Shipping & Shipbuilding Directory
499 (1966). During 1943-1944, United States shipyards launched 2,797 merchant vessels. Id.
189. Hood, U.S. Shipbuilders Take Strong Position, Marine Eng. Log, Feb. 1966, at 49.
190. The CAB had denied authority to the locals to acquire small jets. Upon a showing
that the low seat mile cost would reduce subsidy, the CAB reversed itself and allowed the
locals to purchase small jets such as the Boeing 737, DC-9, and BAC-111. Aviation Week &
Space Technology, March 6, 1967, at 235.
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can result in internal subsidy, whereby the local carriers will charge the
dense short-haul market passengers to help defray the cost of providing
services to marginal markets. The subsidy would probably remain and
only the porte-monnaie from which it came would change. 191
All air market transfers, internal versus direct subsidy considerations,
and competition between trunklines and locals are undertaken in the
domestic environment. The MSB, however, must subsidize the "only
important segment of U.S. industry which sells virtually its entire product
in the international market, and under a price system which makes it
difficult for American operators to secure higher rates for superior ser-
vices."' 92 This difference in the primary operational environment of the
carriers subsidized by the CAB and the MSB must be recognized to
evaluate effectively the obstacles confronting the MSB in its attempts at
subsidy reduction. In a comprehensive study of the United States inter-
national air transport industry, Professor Sackrey noted that "during
the 1954-1963 decade, the [international air] industry flew 64.8 billion
passenger revenue miles, a truly remarkable achievement .... During the
1954-1963 decade, the nine carriers in the industry flew over 46 billion un-
utilized seat miles, an unutilized capacity equivalent to that required to
fly 46 million people an average distance of 1,000 miles !' 193
As a partial answer to the unutilized seat miles problem, Professor
Sackrey quoted a recommended decision of a CAB Hearing Examiner
that "U.S. citizens have not demonstrated any solid preference for U.S.
flag services over those offered by foreign competitors."'" 4 Statistics sup-
port this observation. Air passenger travel between the United States and
foreign countries increased from 2,643,000 in 1956 to 9,780,000 in 1966.19"
However, the U.S. flag airlines' share of the market decreased from 66.7
per cent in 1956 to 51.5 per cent in 1966.10 International air carriage of
freight shows similar decreases. The average revenue per ton mile of
freight carried by the U.S. flag airlines decreased from 30.88 cents per
191. See Dockser, Airline Service Abandonment and Consolidation-A Chapter In the
Battle Against Subsidization, 32 J. Air L. & Com., 496 (1966).
192. S. Lawrence, supra note 181, at 216.
193. Sackrey, Overcapacity in the United States International Air Transport Industry, 32
J. Air L. & Com., 24, 69 (1966). Mr. Herbert Elish, Administrative Assistant to the Chair-
man of the CAB, commented on May 5, 1967, before a seminar on the CAB and the Adminis-
trative Process at the George Washington Law School, that unutilized seat mile evaluation
can be misleading, and that a more valid conclusion can be reached by comparing operating
revenues. Such a comparison shows operating revenues for international and territorial
airlines in 1956 totaled over $471 million, while in 1963 the total exceeded $1 billion. Air
Transport Association of America, supra note 144, at 31.
194. Sackrey, supra note 193, at 73.
195. Air Transport Association of America, supra note 144, at 41.
196. Id.
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mile in 1956 to 19.91 in 1966, for a total decrease of 35.5 per cent. 19T
Domestic freight revenues, on the other hand, decreased from 20.66 cents
per mile to 20.21, or a decrease of only 2.2 per cent."8 Since international
U.S. flag air carriers are not limited in their route structure to interna-
tional markets, and generally operate profitable domestic routes as well,
the CAB is provided with further flexibility in this integrated route struc-
ture. Any increase in domestic profits, in excess of an approved domestic
ratio of return, but insufficient to cover international need, can be offset
against probable international losses. 9".
Notwithstanding legislative and operational limitations, the subsidized
American flag operator has retained a substantial share of the higher
valued water-bome commerce by building and operating more high speed
vessels than all other maritime nations combined. The more modern and
faster American flag vessel obtains more valuable cargo shipped at higher
rates.2" New shipping concepts, such as containerization, sea barge
carriage, and surface effect ships, provide the subsidized operator with
more effective tools to compete with foreign flag lines for the water-borne
foreign commerce of the United States.2 °'
IX. PROPOSALS
In concluding this comparative study of sea and air subsidies, it should
be noted that the subsidy program has been successful in providing the
the United States with the most modern (and still privately owned) air
and ocean transportation systems in the world. This result is an essential
ingredient of the complex and highly organized American economy.
However, past accomplishments should not thwart efforts to continue
these attainments through new cooperative institutions and revitalized
enterprise so as to reduce the cost to the Government. The proposals
offered by various writers in the air industry and by respective maritime
groups properly reflect this effort.
The study has also revealed striking differences. They relate not so
197. Id. at 40.
198. Id.
199. Trans World Airlines, Inc., Mail Rates, Order No. E-22022 (1965), 34-35.
200. Foreign flag lines average $30 revenue per deadweight ton carried while the average
revenue earned by the subsidized American flag operator amounts to $45 per ton. Committee
of American Steamship Lines, Progress of the US. Liner Fleet Under the Merchant Marine
Act, 1936 (1964).
201. Upon introduction of the containerization program the MSB had required a separate
recapture accounting provision so that the Government could share in the higher profits.
The MSB subsequently reversed itself on the grounds that separate recapture was illegal.
Lykes Bros., Request for Construction Differential Subsidy, Docket A-30, (1967). See Wall St.
J., May 9, 1967, at 18, col. 1 (editorial); N.Y. Times, May 11, 1967, at 93, col. 1.
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much to the basic policies of the MSB and the CAB in reducing subsidy
payments wherever technology and opportunity permit, but to the
statutory authorities and operational institutions through which the
administrative determinations by the respective agencies must be made.
The parity concept found in the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 has re-
mained intact for 31 years, notwithstanding its severe limitations upon
MSB discretion in promulgating procedures to determine the amount of
subsidy payments. As we have seen, the parity concept is an extremely
cumbersome, expensive and complex principle to administer and deter-
mine. It not only requires the assimilation of a massive array of facts
which must be evaluated and refined into a formula to arrive at a rate
of subsidy, but is further complicated by the requirement that where there
is a dispute as to the applicable rate and a hearing results, an oath of
secrecy regarding this data will be imposed. °2 More important, however,
is the inescapable fact that there is no built-in provision in the Merchant
Marine Act to provide an incentive for "efficiency and frugality." Recog-
nizing this deficiency, the Interagency Maritime Task Force, after a
careful study and evaluation of maritime subsidy programs, proposed
that: "The subsidy rate (that is, cents of subsidy per dollar of revenue),
would be calculated from average industry cost parity experience in the
trading area or areas served. The subsidy would be paid at a different
rate per dollar of revenue in the different areas, based on average recent
U.S.-to-foreign cost differentials on the routes encompassed by the
areas.1 20 3 This proposal represents a modification of the CAB "need"
theory and has the advantage of providing a framework within which the
subsidized ocean-going operator can effectively demonstrate "efficiency
and frugality." The inherent limitation of this proposal is that its adoption
would retain the requirement of accumulating detailed cost data and
formula-making since it merely eliminates individual route determina-
tions. Administrative parity determinations would still be substituted
for market place judgments.
Various other proposals to change operating differential subsidy deter-
202. The Rules of Practice and Procedure of the MSB are codified at 46 C.F.R. §§ 201.1-
01.186 (1967). Section 201.151 provides: "Upon objection to public disclosure of any In-
formation sought to be elicited during a hearing, and a showing of cause satisfactory to the
presiding officer, the witness shall disclose such information only in the presence of tile
presiding officer, official reporter and such attorneys or representatives of each party . . .
after all present have been sworn to secrecy."
203. Interagency Maritime Task Force, The Merchant Marine In National Defense and
Trade-A Policy and A Program 15 (1965). The Maritime Advisory Committee rejected
this proposal and recommended that "the cost-equalization parity concept of operating
subsidy payments be continued." Maritime Advisory Committee, Maritime Policy and
Program of the United States 12 (1965).
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minations have been made, ranging from a payment to provide a reason-
able rate of return to relating wages of American seamen to U.S. shoreside
occupations. 04 Such proposals fail to delimit a ship replacement procedure
and do not consider the dual competitive nature of the American merchant
marine.205
One possible answer to the subsidy dilemma is to open the program to
competitive bidding by all American flag vessels. The MSB has recognized
that "unfortunately the differential character of the operating subsidy
program, while providing assistance to the carriers, does not appear to
furnish a sufficient incentive for the U.S. flag carriers to increase their
participation in U.S. foreign commerce." - " Initially, the Board can
determine, upon proper statutory authorization and the expiration of
existing contracts,1 7 the number of carriers and the amount of voyages
required to carry a "substantial portion" of the foreign water-borne
commerce of the United States on, for example, Trade Route 10.- 08
The Board can then request bids from all existing Trade Route 10
carriers on the amount of subsidy required. To avoid the historical
practice of bidding at a loss and forcing an efficient operator out of
service, the Board can require submission by the operator of its actual
costs incurred and revenues actually earned in the preceding year, plus its
estimate of costs to be incurred and revenues to be earned for the bidding
year. The average of the amounts representing costs and the average of
the amounts representing revenue, plus reasonable profit, will represent
204. S. Lawrence, supra note 181, at 153 n.58.
205. The subsidized operator must not only compete with other American flag carriers
on routes with double and triple tracking, but also with non-subsidized operators and
various foreign flag competitors.
206. United States Lines, Subsidy Route 12, Docket No. S-147, 5 SRR 151, 157 (1964).
The Secretary of Commerce has recently noted that "subsidy does not guarantee profits nor
does it assure that there will be no losses." Moore-McCormack Lines, Reorganization Pro-
posal, 5 SRR 137, 139 (1964).
207. The average operating differential subsidy contract is for a period of 20 years and
has been in effect since 1950. In addition to the original 63 contract pages, it has been
amended from time to time by an additional 170 addenda.
208. Trade Route 10 is traffic between US. Atlantic ports and ports in the Mediterranean
and Black Seas, Portugal, Spain and Morocco. The following American flag carriers provide
service on Trade Route 10:
American Export Isbrandsten Lines (Subsidized)
American President Lines, Ltd. (Subsidized)
Prudential Lines Inc. (Subsidized)
Central Gulf Steamship Corp. (Unsubsidized)
Isthmian Lines, Inc. (Unsubsidized)
Levant Line (Unsubsidized)
States Marine Lines, Inc. (Unsubsidized)
Waterman Steamship Corporation (Unsubsidized)
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the operator's bid. The operator with the higher revenue total and lower
cost total would require the lesser amount of subsidy and would provide
the service for Trade Route 10. Double and triple tracking would continue
where the Board determines the traffic warrants the service of two or
three subsidized lines. The unsuccessful operator would be induced to
lower its costs and increase its revenues for the next bidding period which
will be reflected in its subsequent bid price. The same procedure can be
carried out on all existing essential trade routes. It would provide the
efficient operator with sufficient funds to compete effectively with his
predominant foreign competitor and at the same time compete effectively
with his American flag competitor for subsidy. This procedure would
effectively provide the spark which competition normally instills in
American business enterprise.
The ship replacement subsidy program would continue, distinct from
the operating subsidy but recognized for what in fact it is: a subsidy to
American shipyards. Construction subsidy payments would include an
amount sufficient to undertake full development of marine technological
innovations. Through design simplification and an effort by cognizable
government agencies to redelegate their regulatory and inspection respon-
sibilities to one agency, savings could be effected and utilized to exploit
these innovations more fully.
The bidding procedure can also be applied by the CAB in marginal
markets. Under the revised rate formula, relating subsidy payment to
city pairs, unprofitable traffic routes can now be localized and identified.
Upon the designation of these routes and subsequent determination by
the CAB as to the amount and extent of air service required to promote
"adequate, economic, and efficient service by air carriers at reasonable
charges without unjust discrimination," invitations can be issued to bid
for the amount of subsidy required to provide air services to these
points. 20 9 The rationale of the CAB for its recently announced policy of
substituting internal subsidy for direct Government aid is questionable.
209. The following is a typical local air carrier certification:
North Central Airlines, Inc., is hereby authorized, subject to the provisions hereinafter set
forth, the provisions of Title IV of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, and the orders, rules,
and regulations issued thereunder, to engage in air transportation with respect to persons,
property, and mail, as follows:
* * * 2. Between the terminal point Chicago, Ill., the intermediate points Milwaukee,
Oshkosh-Appleton, Manitowoc-Sheboygan (to be served through Manitowoc Municiple
Airport), and Green Bay-ClintonviUle, Wis., Marinettee, Wis., Menominee, Mich., and
Escanaba, Iron Mountain-Kingsford, and Marquette, Mich., and the terminal point Hancock-
Houghton, Mich .....
C.A.B. Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity (as amended) for Route 86, North
Central Airlines, Inc. (issued pursuant to C.A.B. Order No. E-24731 (1967)).
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Since the national policy requires an adequate, economical and efficient
air service, the nation should pay for it. Certainly the passengers in dense
markets should not bear the cost of carrying out national policy. Under
the bidding procedure, the nation would receive these required services
at the lowest possible price.
Legislative and administrative acceptance of the bidding procedure
will undoubtedly result in the elimination of inefficient air and ocean
carriers. Such a loss would result in a somewhat leaner but more capable
ocean-air transportation system, undertaking with "efficiency and fru-
gality" the realization of the national policies enunciated in the Federal
Aviation Act and the Merchant Marine Act.
&PPENDIX
The principal components of the new formula are as follows:
A. The sum of the following expense provisions:
( 1) $2,000,000 per carrier;
( 2) $18,000 per station;
( 3) $18 per weighted departure; 1
4) 2.00 cents per available seat-mile; 2
(5) $3 per originated passenger; 3 and
(6) 19.0 cents per revenue ton-mile.4
B. Less: The revenue requirements of:
(7) 6.00 cents per revenue passenger-mile; 5 and
(8) $5 per originated passenger.6
C. Less:
(9) A fixed percentage of each carrier's subsidy computed pursuant to
A and B above.7
D. Plus or minus:
(10) A dollar adjustment based on measuring each carrier's subsidy
computed pursuant to A, B, and C, above, against its own adjusted
subsidy need for the base period. The subsidy payable is adjusted
by 70 per cent of the difference to increase payments to those
1. Departures are weighted as follows: DC-3 and Nord-262 at 1.000; and all other
equipment types at 1.7000.
2. Available seats are based on 24 seats for DC-3 and Nord-262; and 40 for all other
equipment types (including jets). Appropriate provision would be made for aircraft types
smaller than the DC-3.
3. Derived from required passenger loads as follows: DC-3 and Nord-262, 6-8 for 1-2
round-trips; all other equipment, 13-17 for 1-2 round-trips.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. The percentage for each carrier is derived from a curve fitted to passenger revenue
per route-mile as experienced in the year ending June 30, 1966.
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carriers for which the computed subsidy is less than the adjusted
need and conversely to reduce it in those instances where the
computed subsidy exceeds the adjusted need.
E. The total cumulative subsidy otherwise due and payable to each carrier
pursuant to A, B, C, and D, above, could not exceed ceilings established for
each carrier.8
The total cumulative subsidy otherwise due and payable to each carrier
pursuant to A through E, above, shall further be subject to a revenue growth
adjustment, as follows:
(11) The adjustment to each carrier's subsidy for revenue growth
realized from its system operations as measured against the rev-
enues realized in the base year 9 will be 15 per cent of gross system
passenger revenue growth less cost offsets as follows:
2.00 cents per increased standard available seat-mile' and
$3.00 per increased originated passenger.
The increases are to be measured against the standard available
seat-miles and originated passengers realized in the year ended
June 30, 1966. Provided, however, that the percentage of recognized
increased seat-miles shall not exceed the percentage growth in
system passenger revenues less 15 percentage points.
8. The established ceilings are set forth on the estimated subsidy rate for each individual
local-service carrier as the gross computed subsidy.
9. The year ending June 30, 1966.
10. For the purpose of the revenue growth adjustment available seats are based on 24
seats for DC-3 and Nord-262, 40 seats for all other piston and turbo-prop equipment larger
than DC-3, 50 seats for BAC-111 and DC-9 equipment, and 60 seats for B-727 equipment.
Appropriate provision would be made for aircraft types smaller than the DC-3.
